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Abstract—Dynamic and flexible optical networking combined
with virtualization and softwarisation enabled by Network Func-
tion Virtualization (NFV) and Software Defined Networking
(SDN) are the key technology enablers for supporting the
dynamicity, bandwidth and latency requirements of emerging
5G network services. To achieve the end-to-end connectivity
objective of 5G, Network Services (NSes) must be often deployed
transparently over multiple administrative and technological
domains. Such scenario often presents security risks since a
typical NS1 may comprise a chain of network functions, each
executed in different remote locations, and tampering within the
network infrastructure may compromise their communication.
To avoid such threats, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has
been identified and proposed as a future-proof method immune
to any algorithmic cryptanalysis based on fundamental quantum-
physics mechanisms to distribute symmetric keys. The maturity
of QKD has enabled the research and development of quantum
networks with gradual coexistence with classical optical networks
using carrier-grade telecom equipment. This makes the QKD
technology a suitable candidate for security of distributed and
virtualised network services.
In this paper, for the first time, we propose a dynamic
quantum-secured optical network for supporting network ser-
vices that are dynamically created by chaining Virtual Network
Functions (VNFs2) over multiple network domains. This work in-
cludes a new flex-grid quantum-switched Reconfigurable Optical
Add Drop Multiplexer (q-ROADM), extensions to SDN-enabled
optical control plane, and extensions to NFV orchestration to
achieve quantum-aware, on-demand chaining of VNFs. The
experimental results verify the capability of routing quantum and
classical data channels both individually and dynamically over
shared fibre links. Moreover, quantum secured chaining of VNFs
in 5G networks is experimentally demonstrated via interconnect-
ing four autonomous 5G islands simultaneously through the q-
ROADM with eight optical channels using the 5GUK Exchange
orchestration platform. The experimental scenarios and results
confirm the benefit of the proposed data plane architecture and
control/management plane framework.
Index Terms—5G, management and network orchestration,
network function virtualization, quantum key distribution, secure
network service, q-ROADM.
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1Network Service is a combination of multiple virtual and physical network
functions created to realise a desired network functionality
2Hardware network functions when implemented in software and deployed
as VMs or containers are called VNFs
I. INTRODUCTION
With the mature techniques for radio access, fronthaul, and
backhaul networks available, the evolving 5G architecture needs
to focus on developing solutions for managing disaggregation
and cloudification of network functions and guarantee the
security of end-to-end 5G network services [1], [2]. Managing
disaggregation and cloudification at large scale is fundamental
to future 5G service-offering, as it enables new types of 5G
services including cross-domain network slicing and advanced
neutral hosting scenarios, therefore delivering the real value
promised by 5G [3] [4]. In this paper, we orchestrate services
over multiple network domains with heterogeneous network
devices and cloud infrastructure to deploy end-to-end services
[5].
5G networks are expected to be the driving force behind
verticals such as smart cities, digital health and manufacturing
enabled by meeting the stringent KPI requirements including
latency, bandwidth and massive connectivity [6] [7]. Dynamic
and rapid deployment of network services using techniques
like SDN and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) have
allowed telecom operators and service providers to meet such
strict KPIs. Organisations like European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI), Metro Ethernet Forum, and Open
Networking Foundation have driven the development of systems
such as NFV Orchestrators (NFVO), allowing service providers
to create and deploy the network services on the commodity
hardware as VNFs, reducing the CAPEX and OPEX as well
as making the system more fault tolerant and dynamic.
However, one of the major objectives of 5G is to achieve the
end-to-end connectivity over heterogeneous network segments
[7] [6], which most of the current NFVO does not support.
With edge and cloud systems working coordinately, the NFVO
systems have been designed towards creating a seamless inter-
connection in a single domain [8]. As discussed in [9], there has
been recent work done in the field of multi-domain orchestration
allowing service providers to create end-to-end network services
irrespective of the underlying network administrative domains.
Such systems abstract the distribution and disaggregation of
resources across multiple network domains for the end-users. In
addition, optical networks play an essential role in connecting
these services while achieving the desired KPIs [8]. Despite
these developments, end-to-end security remains a concern and
could prevent its full operation. For instance, authors in [10]
describe different security threats over MECs, considering
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Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. Security and privacy attacks
are also illustrated in [11] over fog computing architectures in
which off-the-shelf solutions are proposed to eliminate these
threats.
Quantum key distribution is a technology to utilise quantum
mechanisms to encrypt and decrypt key information. Therefore,
quantum cryptography is being considered as the technology for
network security recently since the quantum-grade encryption
mechanism proves to be information theoretical secure. Thus
it can be regarded as the ultimate technology to strengthen
the physical layer communication security [12]. Worldwide
demonstrations confirm the practicality of quantum encryp-
tion including different testbeds in Vienna, Tokyo, Battelle,
Cambridge, Florence and China (Beijing-Shanghai) [13]–[18].
Moreover, the coexistence of the quantum channel and classical
data channels prove the feasibility of quantum encryption
together with standard telecommunication channels without the
need of surplus optical fibre for point-to-point transmission
[19]–[21].
From the networking point of view, approaches integrating
QKD and Software Defined Networking (SDN) have been
reported in [22]–[25]. From these research works, it has
been proved that SDN is beneficial for QKD enabled optical
networks to optimise the performance of the QKD links after
applying a customised network configuration. For instance, it
is demonstrated [25] that real-time monitoring of quantum
parameters provides information to the SDN controller to
secure lightpaths in the optical network with flexible optical
path configurations to ensure the uninterrupted distribution of
quantum keys in case of physical layer attacks. Furthermore,
the use of QKD for NFV has also been studied and several
demonstrations verify the application of AES encryption using
quantum keys to secure virtual network functions (VNFs) [23],
[26]. Based on these advances on QKD technologies and field
trials, and their combination with SDN and NFV, quantum key
distribution can also be applied to secure interconnections of
distributed VNFs within 5G framework.
In this paper, we address the problem by experimentally
demonstrating a quantum-secured multi-domain 5G network
using an orchestrator, the 5GUK Exchange, for end-to-end
service composition with the following novel features: 1) On-de-
mand composition of Network Services (NSes) by chaining
distributed VNFs hosted in data centers belonging to different
5G network domains; 2) Extending SDN control plane and
OSM orchestrator to support quantum secured NFV chaining;
3) Utilising QKD for quantum-securing the NSes via a
quantum meshed network enabled by a novel 4 degree quantum
switched flex-grid q-ROADM; and 4) On-demand optimisation
of the service quality of NSes (bandwidth and connectivity)
by dynamically adjusting the optical parameters such as
modulation format and power. We extend our previous work
in [27] by providing detailed description, implementation and
more results of the proposed network architecture, in data plane
and control/management plane sides. The experimental results
validate the value of the proposed scheme. The rest of the paper
is organised as follows: Section II describes the motivation,
the concept and the scenarios of the proposed multi-domain
secured network service orchestration. Section III describes
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Fig. 1: Overall concept of QKD secured 5GUK Exchange
scenario
the architecture of the proposed q-ROADM to allow quantum
channel and data channel switching. Section IV explains the
experimental testbed physical connectivity and setup. Section V
covers the description of control plane and management plane
of the physical experimental testbed. Section VI reveals the
data plane results and control/management results from the
experiment and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. CONCEPT FOR MULTI-DOMAIN SECURE NETWORK
SERVICES COMPOSITION
Fig. 1 depicts two individual autonomous network domains
(islands) where a local NFVO provisions and controls the
computing and network resources through the the Virtual In-
frastructure Manager (VIM) and SDN controller. As described
earlier, each NFVO could deploy and manage the NSes on
a single network domain. To achieve the goal of end-to-end
orchestration, we have used and extended the 5GUK Exchange
[28] to create inter-island NSes. Additionally, the inter-island
NSes should exhibit enhanced dynamic characteristics, provide
the bandwidth and latency requirements between VNFs and
effectively address security concerns raised by the distributed
nature of the inter-island NSes.
To realise this, in our proposed implementation
1) We used the 5GUK Exchange [28] to support the inter-
island NS management and orchestration in order to allow
for mixing and matching VNFs from multiple islands
2) We developed a new quantum switch enabled q-ROADM
to provide dynamic inter-island optical network connec-
tivity for high bandwidth and low latency VNF chaining
across the multiple domains and to provide dynamical
quantum key switching.
3) We extended the use of the dynamic optical network to
accommodate for quantum channels in a coexisting form,
in order to create secured inter-island NS using QKD over
the same fiber as classical traffic.
4) We extended the 5GUK Exchange capabilities to provision
and control the inter-island optical network resources and
the QKD resources across the islands (to be discussed in
section V)
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To verify the complexity and dynamicity of our concept, we
executed three different scenarios (a to c) in increasing order
of complexity, which is shown below in section VI-B. For
simplicity, we consider each island exposing multiple NSes,
each consisting of a single VNF. To begin, we consider a
scenario where an end-user wants to deploy multiple inter-
island NSes between the 4 autonomous islands, known as
Island 1, Island 2, Island 3, and Island 4. Each island represents
a metro network connecting 5G access network and feeding
corresponding 5G traffic into core optical network through a
layer 2 switch. In scenario 1, only one communication channel
between the two islands (Island 2 and Island 4) needs to
be secured while other channels remain unsecured. Moving
on to the next case all islands communicate with the NS
between Island 1 and Island 3 also being secured along with
the existing Island 2 and Island 4. Finally, to verify the dynamic
nature of the VNF deployment and NS creation, we switch the
quantum channels in scenario 3 (Island 1 - Island 4 and Island
2 - Island 3) with respect to scenario 2 (Island 1 - Island 3
and Island 2 - Island 4 secured). In this scenario, the 5GUK
Exchange reconfigures the L0 network to switch the quantum
channel while keeping the deployed NS intact, creating the
minimum service disruption. During the experiment, while
creating the secure channel, the respective NS wavelength is
combined with an additional QKD channel and are transmitted
in parallel across the optical network. For each optical and
quantum channel, the wavelengths (λ1) are communicated to
the individual islands by the 5GUK Exchange which creates
the L0 and L2 network between the selected islands.
III. Q-ROADM DESCRIPTION
To enable classical data channels and QKD signal routing
and switching functionality, the q-ROADM needs to provide
low loss switching capability for the QKD channel as QKD
transmitter Alice emit single photon level light thus it is
critically sensitive to power loss [29]. The conventional
ROADMs designed for switching classical data channels,
usually associated with 12 - 20 dB insertion loss [30], is not
feasible for QKD signal routing and switching. Apart from high
insertion loss, the ASE noise generated from pre-amplifiers and
post-amplifiers of the ROADM would fall into the quantum
channel, posing a significant challenge to the QKD receiver
Bob [31].
To overcome the drawbacks of the conventional ROADM,
we propose a colourless and directionless (CD) flex-grid QKD
enabled reconfigurable optical add-drop multiplexer architecture
design based on the concept of Architecture on Demand (AoD)
[32], known as q-ROADM. In Fig. 2, the design of a four-
degree bidirectional CD q-ROADM is illustrated. All the
optical devices are connected to the optical fibre switch (OFS)
backplane, where new devices can be added to support new
functions required by new network service. The AoD based
q-ROADM can also be quickly programmed to increase or
decrease the number of degrees as well as transform to a hybrid
q-ROADM where part of degrees support coexistent quantum
and data channel switching while the rest only support data
channel switching.
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Fig. 2: 4 degree CD q-ROADM architecture design.
For each degree, the MUX/DEMUX is designed to add/drop
local classic data channels, whereas the Alice or Bob is also
used for adding or dropping the QKD channel locally to secure
the data channel originating or terminating at the local node.
The band-pass filter (BPF) placed before the quantum receiver
Bob can filter out-band crosstalk from the WSS. The proposed
q-ROADM architecture supports QKD and classic data channels
switching functionality between any pair of ports. The QKD
signal dropping and routing functionalities are realised by
controlling the optical fibre switch behaviour, which is shown
as the dashed line in Fig. 2. The only limitation is that two
QKD channels cannot be routed to the same output port, due
to OFS constraint as well as the colour constraint. The pre-
amplifier is completely removed to avoid the ASE noise falling
into the QKD channel. The output signal of post-amplifiers
is combined and filtered by the WSS to avoid the ASE noise
falling into the QKD channel. Moreover, the WSS at the output
of each port equalises the power of different data channels and
controls the total data channel power coexisting with the QKD
channel of the following fibre link. The 95:5 fibre splitter is
used as a low loss combiner for QKD signal to aggregate the
QKD channel and the data channels. The proposed q-ROADM
architecture gives around 5.3 dB loss for the QKD routing
and switching, approximate 5.9 dB, and 1.2 dB power loss for
dropping and adding QKD channel respectively.
In contrast to the low loss characteristics of a quantum
channel, the proposed q-ROADM architecture would introduce
higher penalty to the data channels compared to the conven-
tional ROADM as it poses higher power loss to the classical
data channels while only permits post-amplifier. The power
loss is around 23 dB for bypassing data channels, 21.5 dB for
adding data channels, and 8.5 dB for dropping data channels.
Its nature is similar to the coexistence of classical data channels
and QKD channel in the fibre link only allowing extremely low
power of the data channels, where the low power data channels
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Fig. 3: The architecture of QKD secured 5G exchange experimental testbed setup.
perform worse than usual power data channels. The design of
q-ROADM sacrifices the performance of the data channels, but
can provide the low loss capability of adding, dropping, and
switching the QKD channel. The impact of high signal quality
degradation from q-ROADM to the classical data channels
can be balanced by deploying robust digital signal processing
techniques, such as modulation format adaption, higher forward
error correction (FEC) code rate and probabilistic shaping.
IV. ISLAND PHYSICAL NETWORK DESCRIPTION
The paper implements, for the first time, a quantum-switched
optical network that allows: 1) to dynamically control and
assign wavelength, FEC coding rate, modulation format and
power of each optical channel interconnecting the VNFs; 2) a
coexistent scheme of quantum and classical channels where any
combination of mixed or independent quantum and classical
signals arriving from one island can be forwarded to any other
island providing a full 4-degree q-ROADM functionality that
seamlessly interconnects the four islands, as shown in fig. 3;
3) dynamic configuration of different pairs of discrete-variable
(DV) QKD transmitters (Alices) and receivers (Bobs) enabling
provisioning/creation/use of new quantum paths.
Specifically, each NS deployed through 5GUK Exchange on
each island is assigned a specific VLAN, where all VLANs
are aggregated in a VLAN trunk through a layer 2 Corsa
openflow switch.As an open reference design for open and
disaggregated converged packet/optical switch, the voyager
switch then convert packet stream into a lightpath (and vice
versa) where coherent bandwidth variable transponder (with
speed up to 200Gbps) assigns each VLAN to a respective
coherent link with controlled bit-rate and modulation format
(QPSK, 8-QAM, 16-QAM) (see QIDCM in Section V-C). The
bandwidth variable transponder (BVT) ports of the Voyager
depicted in Fig. 3 of each island are then multiplexed in a
WSS (Finisar) and coupled to the island’s DV-QKD quantum
channel generated by an IDQ Clavis 2. An additional server that
interfaces the IDQ Clavis 2 with the QIDCM is also responsible
for providing the quantum keys to software encryptors that
encrypt NFV data. In this paper, ChaCha20 algorithm is used
in the proposed software encryptor [33].
The multiplexed quantum and classical signals are transmit-
ted over the same fiber in a coexisting scheme to the proposed
fully functional low-loss, 4-degree q-ROADM where the mixed
signals arriving from each island are first demultiplexed through
a WSS and coupled to an optical space switch (Polatis), both
controlled by QIDCM. 5 km fibres are deployed in the testbed
to connect each island to CD q-ROADM. For the output
ports of the q-ROADM, we have two options according to
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Fig. 4: Sequence diagram of Quantum-Secured Inter-Domain 5G Service Orchestration and On-Demand NFV Chaining.
the destinations: 1) quantum and classical data channels are
multiplexed again in the bypass output ports; and 2) quantum
and classical data channels are separated and dropped locally
from the drop port. On the bypass port of the q-ROADM,
unamplified quantum channels and amplified/filtered classical
data channels are coupled through a 95:5 coupler. For the drop
ports quantum and classical channels are separately driven to
the island. On the islands receiver side, the mixed channels
from the bypass ports are demultiplexed through a fixed arrayed
waveguide grating (AWG). For both cases, total quantum
channels losses over the q-ROADM do not exceed 6 dB, while
worst case end-to-end power loss for the quantum channel
connecting two islands via two bypass ports is around 10dB.
V. 5GUK EXCHANGE: NFV MANO LAYER FOR
INTER-ISLAND COMMUNICATION
The connectivity and orchestration of VNFs are managed
by the 5GUK Exchange (5GUKEx) [28]. As per the scenarios
mentioned in Section II, the NSes are interconnected to operate
between the multiple islands. The 5GUKEx has been extended
in this work to make it quantum and Layer 0 aware. The
5GUKEx is composed of multiple specialized components
supporting the inter-island network service composition and
management. These include the NS broker to coordinate
between multiple islands and an Inter Domain Connectivity
Manager (IDCM) to create the underlying network connectivity.
To complete the block, a thin layer of orchestration is hosted
over each island called Island Proxy which communicates with
the NS Broker to share the island capabilities and the NS
catalogues.
A. Quantum-aware Network Service Broker
The Quantum-aware Network Service Broker (QNSB) inter-
faces between the Island Proxy and the 5GUKEx. It receives
island registration requests containing the Network Service
Descriptors (NSDs) and Virtual Network Function Descriptors
(VNFDs) as part of the NS catalogues from the Island Proxies.
It registers the island on 5GUKEx and passes this information
to the Network Service Manager (NSM). The QNSB is invoked
while instantiating, deploying and terminating the NSes across
islands. It provides unique ID to each island during registration
to track and monitor the deployed NSes.
B. Network Service Manager
The Network Service Manager (NSM) is responsible for
the lifecycle of the deployed inter-island NS. It stores the
NS catalogues shared by the islands during registration and
provides them to the NS Composer for creating end-to-end NS.
It also communicates with the QNSB using the south-bound
APIs while managing the lifecycle of the inter-island NS.
C. Quantum-Aware Inter-Domain Connectivity Manager
As described in [28], the Quantum-aware IDCM is responsi-
ble of provisioning the inter-island network connectivity using
the underlying SDN controller. For this experiment, the IDCM
is extended to make it quantum and layer 0 aware. For this
particular use-case, in addition to the dynamic L2 network
slicing, a block for quantum control and Quantum aware flex-
grid Routing and Wavelength Assignment (QRWA) is created.
As shown in Fig. 3, the QKD control is designed to check
if the inter-island NS is requested to be a secure end-to-end
service. In this case, the QKD starts the Quantum Key Exchange
between the two islands before setting up the L2 packet
network. Additionally, the QRWA controls the configuration of
the underlying q-ROADM composed of WSS and OFS. The
QRWA configures the connecting ports and assign the required
wavelengths to the configured ports
D. Network Service Composer
The Network Service Composer exposes the North Bound
Interface (NBI) of 5GUKEx and hosts a Graphical User
Interface allowing users to compose the inter-island NS by
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(a) (b)
Fig. 5: Arrayed waveguide grating performance characterisation for quantum channel. (a): Quantum secret key rate and QBER
vs AWG temperature; (b): Arrayed waveguide grating filter profile for quantum channel
combining the network services shared by individual islands.
The composition results in templates of inter-island NS that
the user can choose to deploy. A deployment request invokes
the NSM and NSB which interact with the Island Proxy to
deploy an NS on individual islands.
E. Island Proxy
Each island is assumed to host its own ETSI NFV Man-
agement and Orchestration (NFV-MANO) system. The Island
Proxy consumes the north-bound APIs of the NFV-MANO and
registers island to the 5GUKEx using the security certificates
shared with each island. On registration, Island Proxy shares
the NS catalogue with the 5GUKEx. At a later stage, the island
can either reconnect (without updating the NS catalogue) or re-
register (sharing the updated NS catalogue). For this experiment,
the Island Proxy, as described in [28] has been extended to
make it layer 0 aware using the NBIs of the underlying SDN
controller at the individual islands. In addition to the creation
of L2 flows, it configures the underlying voyager switches with
the desired wavelengths and the VLANs. The Island Proxy
communicates the VLAN and wavelength information to the
NS Broker, which in turn provides the information to the
QIDCM to create the inter-island network.
Fig. 3. shows the quantum-secured 5GUKEx architecture
and the experimental setup, including the physical optical
network that supports coexistence and independent switching
of quantum channels and classical data channels. For this
experiment, we have connected four different islands to
5GUKEx, sharing multiple NSes with the 5GUKEx. It allows
composition of NSes across islands and dynamic selection of
the quantum secured channel as needed. Each island has its
own representative 5G network with radio access and optical
backhaul along with separate compute and network resources
administered individually by each island.
Fig. 4 shows the exchange of control messages between
the various components of Quantum-Secured Inter-Domain
5G-Service Orchestration. For the sake of simplicity, the
proceedings between 5GUK Exchange components are not
included in the diagram as is already been discussed in this
section.
• 5GUK Exchange is the central point allowing users to
create the multi-domain inter-island NS (iNS). In additon
to the functionality explained in this section, the iNS also
define the wavelength and selects the virtual link to be
secured using quantum channel. Before establishing the
L2 virtual link between the NSes, the QIDCM configure
the underlying OFS and WSS as a part of q-ROADM
with appropriate wavelengths(for classical and quantum
channels) and the port mappings.
• As shown in Fig. 4, once the OFS and WSS (in q-
ROADM) is configured, the QIDCM contact the selected
islands (for secure link) and starts key exchange between
them.
– In case of unsecured channel, the QKD link is not
established rather a classical optical channel is created.
• Since, Key exchange is a long and asynchronous process,
the 5GUKEx starts deploying the requested NSes and
links between them. At first, Fig. 4 shows the interaction
of 5GUKEx to the individual islands where QNSB contact
proxy on each side to configure Voyagers with appropriate
parameters (modulation, freq, VLANs, wavelength etc.)
• On successfully configuring the voyagers, the QNSB
instruct proxy to configure and deploy NSes on respective
islands. The process is as explained previously in this
section, where NFVO on each island is requested to deploy
the VNFs and SDN controller is requested to create the
appropriate flow rules to create an end-to-end iNS.
• Finally, on establishment of the secured QKD channel,
the data-path is established for iNS to be operational with
the desired secured connection.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we first evaluate the performance of data
plane and illustrate the results obtained from the proposed
testbed architecture shown in Fig. 3 against various data channel
coexistence power and modulation formats. The physical layer
results are collected by establishing lightpaths 1) between
islands both connected to the bypass ports of the q-ROADM
(Island 1 and Island 3), and 2) one island connecting the
bypass port of q-ROADM (Island 1) and the other one connects
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Fig. 6: q-ROADM bypass port performance: QKD secret key rate, QBER and classical data channel pre-FEC BER vs per data
channel power. (a) One data channel with PM-QPSK and 25% FEC; (b) Two data channels with PM-QPSK and 25% FEC; (c)
Three data channels with PM-QPSK and 25% FEC; (d) One data channel with PM-16QAM and 25% FEC
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Fig. 7: q-ROADM drop port performance: QKD secret key rate
and classical data channel pre-FEC BER vs per data channel
power
to drop port of q-ROADM (Island 4). Further, the control
and management plane results for three dynamically switched
scenarios as mentioned in Section II are presented. The timing
of network components, computing resources, and quantum
equipment are also depicted to demonstrate and confirm the
flexibility and programmability of the proposed control and
management plane framework over the physical infrastructure.
A. Physical Layer Results
In this subsection, the physical layer characteristics of the
proposed testbed architecture shown in Fig. 3 such as classical
data channel BER and quantum secret key date are investigated
and the results are depicted. The arrayed waveguide grating
in each island as illustrated in Fig. 3 is regarded as a static
DEMUX to decouple the classical data channels and the QKD
channel. The characteristics of the AWG can significantly
affect the performance of quantum channel securing inter-
islands NS. Therefore, central frequency of the AWG needs
to adjusted and calibrated to the frequency of the quantum
channel via temperature control to optimize QKD performance.
Therefore, we test the performance of quantum channel in terms
of secret key rate and quantum bit error rate (QBER) against
the increasing temperature of AWG by directly connecting
Alice and Bob via AWG. In Fig. 5 (a), it is illustrated that
the quantum secret key rate increases while QBER decreases
with the increasing AWG temperature until the best operational
temperature, and then the performance of quantum channel
degrades with further raising temperature of AWG.
At the optimal operational temperature AWG, the central
frequency of AWG port for QKD becomes identical to the
operational frequency of DV-QKD IDQ Clavis 2 system. In
this case, it gives the minimum power loss to the quantum
channel, thus achieving the highest quantum secret key rate
and lowest QBER. To quantify the power loss of QKD channel
passing through AWG, ASE noise used and fed into the port
supporting QKD channel of the AWG in the characterisation
experiment. Power spectral density of the ASE noise before
and after injected into the AWG port are measured via optical
spectrum analyzer. In Fig. 5 (b), the filtering profile of the
AWG port for the quantum channel is illustrated under the
optimal operational temperature for the measurement. For the
AWG used in the experiment, it gives around 2.9 dB power
loss to the quantum channel after careful AWG temperature
adjustment.
To investigate the performance of the proposed quantum
secured 5G service orchestration architecture over the flex-grid
optical networks, we setup the experiment testbed as shown in
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Fig. 8: Three dynamically switched experiment scenarios and their results. (a) The first scenario; (b) The second scenario; (c)
The third scenario; (d) Results of the first scenario; (e) Results of the second scenario; (f) Results of the third scenario.
Fig. 3. It is depicted in Fig. 6 the physical layer characterization
of classical and quantum channels coexistence scheme over
the shared optical network between Island 1 and Island 3 via
the bypass ports of the q-ROADM. The figure reveals the per
channel coexistence power operational windows. The results
show the performance of QKD coexisting with a single data
channel (195.0 THz) using PM-QPSK and 25% FEC overhead
as shown in Fig. 6 (a), two data channels (195.00 THz and
195.10 THz) both using PM-QPSK and 25% FEC overhead
as shown in Fig. 6 (b), three data channels (195.00 THz,
195.10 THz and 195.20 THz) using PM-QPSK and 25% FEC
overhead as shown in Fig. 6 (c), and PM-16QAM signal of
a single data channel (195.00 THz) with 25% FEC overhead
as shown in Fig. 6 (d), in order to sustain both the classical
and quantum channels with secret key rate (SKR) > 0 and
pre-FEC BER < threshold.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed architecture,
the per data channel power is varied. As a result, the overall
aggregated coexistence data channel power can be calculated
as: aggregated power = per channel coexisting power + log10
(number of channels). A maximum of 178 bps secret key
rate for QKD can be achieved on the bypass channel for one
coexisting classical data channel with a quantum channel at
-28 dBm coexistence power. The SKR decreases by 27% when
increasing the coexisting power to -25 dBm. For the case of two
and three classical data channels, slightly worse performance
with 138 bps and 110 bps SKR are achieved at -27.5 dBm
per data channel coexistence power (aggregated power of -
24.5 dBm and -22.73 dBm) respectively. The SKR drops
approximate 15% and 36% respectively when the coexisting
power level increases to -26 dBm compared to -27.5 dBm
coexisting power. As shown in Fig. 6 (a) to 6 (d), the QBER
drops while the quantum secret key rate raises against the
decreasing power of coexistence data channels for all four
scenarios. There are two main factors to limit the power
level of data channel coexisted with the quantum channel
in the proposed architecture: 1) nonlinear impairments and
2) crosstalk. Higher data channel power would impair the
quantum channel by introducing and creating higher level of
Raman scattering [34]. Moreover, the AWG within the local
island to decouple the classical data channel and quantum
channel cannot completely separate them, thus introducing
crosstalk due to data channels to be received by quantum
receiver Bob. For the classical data channels with lower
coexisting power, the EDFAs shown in the system setup in
Fig. 3 introduce higher penalty to them. As a result, it leads
to higher pre-FEC BER for all the cases.
We also investigate the effect of modulation formats of the
classical data channel over the quantum channel via the bypass
port (between Island 1 and Island 3) and the drop port of
the q-ROADM (between Island 1 and Island 4), as shown
in Fig. 6 (d) and Fig. 7 respectively. For bypass - bypass
connection, A higher coexistence power is required when the
data channel utilises PM-16QAM as modulation format, as
compared to using PM-QPSK. As a result, it leads to higher
level of nonlinear impairments interference and the crosstalk
to the quantum channel for the islands communicating through
the bypass ports of q-ROADM. Fig. 6 (d) shows that the
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Fig. 9: Control plane and orchestration timings results for the three scenarios. (a) Scenario 1; (b) Scenario 2; (c) Scenario 3
minimum operational coexistence power for PM-16QAM is
-21.4 dBm, with around 1 dB operational power window, while
the PM-QPSK allows a broader, around 5 dB operational power
range, as shown in Fig. 6 (a). Considering the physical layer
performance between Island 1 and Island 4 via drop port of
q-ROADM, the shorter length fibre compared to fibre between
Island 1 and Island 3 leads to lower power loss and less
nonlinear impairments interference. The band-pass filter at the
drop port placing before Bob is able to filter out-band crosstalk
from WSS. Therefore, maximally 1100 bps quantum secret
key rate can be achieved for various modulation formats and
coexistence data channel power, as depicted in Fig. 7. Due
to different noise level requirements, the pre-FEC BER of
channels vary with their assigned modulation formats. Similar
to Fig. 6, the pre-FEC BER of classical channels grows against
the decreasing coexisting power level.
B. Orchestrator And Control Plane Workflow And Results
The goal of this experiment is to present the flexibility of
the proposed data plane architecture and the proposed control/
management plane framework. As described in section II, three
test scenarios are devised to verify our testbed capabilities and
configuration times during the establishment of new network
services and the reconfiguration of existing ones.
In each scenario, one or more NSes are established and/or
modified. Each NS is defined by its composing VNFs, latency,
bandwidth, and security requirements, as well as its services
starting time and Time To Live (TTL). In our experiments, each
NS is composed of two chained VNFs (one NS with single VNF
in each island), which can be secured by a QKD Clavis pair,
shown as a Secured NS (SNS). To demonstrate the chaining of
distributed VNFs over an optical network, the VNFs belonging
to the same NS are hosted in different islands, interconnected
by classical data channels and an optional quantum channel.
The related optical parameters (i.e., modulation format and
launch power) are defined according to the required quality
of service of each NS. Up to four wavelengths are utilised to
provide bidirectional connection for NS across multiple islands
through the q-ROADM, as shown in Fig. 8. The frequencies
used in our experiment are λ1 195.00 THz, λ2 195.10 THz,
λ3 195.20 THz, and λ4 195.30 THz, with 100 GHz spacing
to suit the grid of AWG deployed in the testbed.
The first scenario, as depicted in Fig. 8 (a), consists of
three NSes with one being secured. Next, we transit to the
second scenario, Fig. 8 (b), by dynamically adding an extra
NS and by securing one of the existing NS with a second
QKD pair, thus increasing the total number of NS to four
with two secured. Finally, in the third scenario, Fig. 8 (c),
the wavelengths between two NS are swapped and the two
quantum channels are reconfigured to secure two other NS.
Fig. 8 (d) to 8 (f) shows the data collected regarding the
classical channels BER and the quantum SKR and QBER on
JOURNAL OF LIGHTWAVE TECHNOLOGY, VOL. XX, NO. X, 2019. 10
all the scenarios.
Fig. 9 shows the timings obtained for management, control,
and data plane functions for the three scenarios. Fig. 9 (a)
details the timings involved in the configuration of the first
scenario. As described by Fig. 4, the process starts with
the 5GUK Exchange orchestration service configuring the q-
ROADM, followed by the QKD system(s). The q-ROADM
configuration time is the sum of the configuration time of the
OFS and the WSSs. The time of OFS is relatively constant.
Thus, major variations on the total q-ROADM setup time are
due to the individual WSS, which varies upon the complexity
of configurations required.
After the optical paths successfully setting up, the orchestra-
tion platform triggers the establishment of the quantum channel
immediately, as this phase requires a significantly longer period
than any other steps. The QKD time comprises the start of
the encryption software, the configuration of the IDQ Clavis
equipment, and the waiting time for the first confirmation that
the quantum keys are being generated successfully. Although
key generation may start before this confirmation message, our
software waits for the acknowledgment as a reliability measure.
The QKD initialization time mainly depends on the attenuation
of the quantum channel where the longer time is associated
with the higher power attenuation.
Meanwhile, in parallel to the QKD establishment, the 5GUK
Exchange service proceeds to the setup of the NSes. First,
the Voyager in each island is configured, taking from 45s to
55s which involves wavelength and power modification, and
up to 80s - 90s when also changing the modulation format.
Since NS1 does not coexist with any quantum channel, it
has an extra power budget, allowing it to be configured to a
denser PM-16QAM modulation scheme. As shown in Fig. 8
(d), the channel (λ4) dropped on the drop port performs better
BER wise when compared with the channels passing through
the bypass port,as revealed in Section VI-A. Afterwards, as
described in Section V, the QNSB requests the island proxies to
deploy the requested NSes. In our results, we have considered
the VNF deployment and activation time. Since we have used
the same NS and VNFs on each island and the islands reside
in the same server rack, the NS deployment and activation
times are similar for each island. Finally, the island proxy
communicates with the local SDN controller to create the L2
flow rules to establish the data plane.
Fig. 9 (b) shows the transition timings from the first to the
second scenario. Following the same logic of the first scenario,
the q-ROADM is reconfigured first, followed by the setup of a
second QKD pair, used to secure the previously created NS1.
Then, a new NS is created (NS4), following the same process
described earlier. After provisioning the fourth classical data
channel and the second quantum channel, the power budget
of NS1 (λ1) is not enough to allow the use of PM-16QAM
as modulation scheme. Therefore, the modulation format NS1
is dynamically switched to the PM-QPSK modulation, hence
allowing a lower coexistence power, -25 dBm instead of -
15 dBm. When comparing the timing results of the first and
the second scenarios, the main differences are QKD and the
islands 1 and 3 Voyager switch configuration time. The setup
of QKD from Island 1 to Island 3 takes ≈ 90% longer than
the setup of QKD from Island 2 to Island 4 due to the higher
end-to-end power attenuation associated the lightpaths passing
through two bypass ports when compared to the bypass-drop
port connection. Also, an additional modulation format change
operation explains the Voyagers slower configurations (≈ 82s).
Finally, Fig. 9 (c) shows the timings of the operations
moving from scenario 2 to scenario 3. As described in
section II, this scenario is created to prove the dynamicity
of the 5GUK Exchange. On analyzing the control plane results,
it is noticeable that the configuration of the NS only includes
Voyager switch configuration, which shows that it is possible
to change the optical layer configuration without redeploying
the VNFs and the local island networking, hence avoiding
further configuration of the SDN controller and the NS setup
layer. Lastly, the measured difference in the QKD time follows
the same behaviour from scenarios one and two. Due to the
difference in attenuation, the QKD securing SNS4 between
Island 1 and 4 (connected to the drop port) is established ≈ 1m
30s faster than the QKD securing SNS2 between Islands 2 and
3 with both connected to the bypass port of q-ROADM.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel AoD based colour-
less, directionless and contentionless QKD switch-enabled flex-
grid ROADM architecture. The performance of the proposed
q-ROADM framework has been experimentally investigated
and prove to be a solid architecture to enable classical data
channels switching and quantum key switching simultaneously.
We have experimentally demonstrated on-demand composition
of quantum secured network services for the first time by
chaining distributed VNFs over an optical network employing
a q-ROADM. The control plane results show the flexibility of
the proposed solution, allowing dynamic establishment of new
network services and reconfiguration of the existing ones.
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